

Framing *The Bling Ring*: (Im)material Psychogeography and Screen Technology

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Humans are spatial creatures. Everywhere we walk, we assess in a spatial tapestry; *this* place feels like *this*. The exploration and learning of a space turns it into a place, investing it with emotions and memories. This transfer was first outlined by French neo-Marxist Guy Debord, who dubbed this enriched landscape psychogeography.¹ Walking in famous cities, it is an eerie yet common experience to look at a certain landmark, one you have never been to before, and have a moment of recognition. I discovered this on a trip to New York, a place which felt haunted by memories I had no right to possess. The city had taken on a *cinematic* familiarity. It was as though, long before I booked my flights, I had already been many times. Of course, in a sense I had. One of cinema's chief pleasures is its ability to provide the illusion of travel.² In the medium's first days, motion pictures were projected out of the windows of stationary train carriages, so that the spectator could experience a journey they could never afford to take otherwise.³ In its earlier forms, cinema was a mode of mass virtual transportation. Even without the elaborate ruse of stationary train carriages, watching a film can feel like being lifted out of the room, and transported into the world on screen. I intend to demonstrate that the impact a film can have on the spectator's psychogeography goes beyond illusory transportation. An examination of how the spectator perceives the landscape behind the screen reveals that the

distinction between material geography and psychogeography is collapsing.

Many authors (Notably Gilles Deleuze, Slavoj Žižek, Brian Massumi and Lev Manovich) have considered aspects of the material/virtual collapse.⁴ However, the emergence of new media platforms has revealed a new avenue of inquiry: a currently unexplored connection between material and immaterial landscapes through psychogeography. Taking Sofia Coppola's *The Bling Ring* (2013) as a case study, this paper outlines the permeation of the virtual and actual in contemporary Los Angeles (or, more specifically, Hollywood), a transfer aided by expectation and repetition. Blurring the distinction between the filmic and the geographic, this paper presents a meditation on the impact of landscapes on the spectator, and of the spectator on these landscapes. With specific reference to the intrusion of small screen and camera technology in the world of *The Bling Ring*, this paper examines how the proliferation of screens has led to an enriched, framed and digital cartography of the material world. The Hollywood depicted in *The Bling Ring* is revealed to be a reflection of a reflection, a cinematic representation that recursively alters our expectation of a place, and in turn changes the manner of its depiction. Thus *The Bling Ring* both expresses Coppola's psychogeographic impression while constituting further alteration of the collective psychogeography of Los Angeles. For clarity's sake, this paper refers to "psychogeography" as outlined by Giuliana Bruno in *Atlas of Emotion*: that of a fundamentally imaginary space suffuse with memory and emotion, one drawn from either fiction or from the subject's impressionistic memories of place.⁵ Psychogeography in this sense exists at the intersection between a space's affect and materiality; and the subject's impression and expectation. In order to understand the roots of the spectator's relationship with psychogeography, I begin my inquiry as broadly as possible, by examining the theory of collective place from Michel de Certeau's *Practice of Everyday Life*.⁶ When applying these concepts of impression and emotion onto film spectatorship and modern life, the frame is revealed as a key figure in both material landscapes and their immaterial abstraction. This paper considers the idea of the frame that encloses the landscape as introduced by Anne Friedberg in *The Virtual Window*.⁷ The importance of the frame is compounded by the intrusion of mobile technology into everyday life. I draw support for this idea from both Deleuze's work on the power of repetition, and by engaging the limitations and quirks of human neuroanatomy and the impact of such elements on the lived experience.

It is this desire that indicates a larger truth about the separation between immaterial and material psychogeography, namely that it has been breached. My argument is that the rupture has been caused by the dynam-

ic, reflexive change that expectation has on perception, and vice versa. This is a position that I come to on two fronts, psychologically and philosophically. By examining *The Bling Ring* and the modern western culture that contextualises it, it becomes clear that—due to the encroachment of mobile and small screen technology—the image of Hollywood has transformed the place. The virtual/actual divide has been permeated to the point of indistinction. This paper stands as a marker of a very specific moment in the history of cinema’s tension between virtual and actual, an account of an emerging scopic regime. Coppola’s film demonstrates that, for the youth who have grown up in the age of camera phones, the distinction between material and immaterial is quickly closing. The frame is shown to be a lens of expectation that the spectator carries with them, and ultimately plans to walk through.

Producing Spaces

Spaces are not just perceived, but *produced*. When exploring the impact of mass media on the production of space, it becomes crucial to consider how the masses (as distinct from institutions and designers) define their spatiality.⁸ For this, I turn to the work of Michel de Certeau. De Certeau’s major project in *The Practice of Everyday Life* is the way that the individual plays with mass culture, and vice versa.⁹ De Certeau saw the agents of a city as free to create and alter mass culture to suit themselves.¹⁰ De Certeau made it clear that while much of a city’s character is promoted via the strategy of governments and institutions, it is the citizen-explorer that is truly empowered to define the space through tactical use. The city’s aura, he claimed, is first and foremost defined by the practical and casual everyday use it is subjected to.¹¹ This effect is best seen in its smallest, simplest and most common form. In a large open field, any person might choose to walk in a certain direction. If the subject repeats this behaviour, and others follow his path, then eventually the grass under their feet dies. A path forms, from the happenstance and unthinking actions of people. De Certeau saw this happening on a grand scale, with the city’s image becoming its own collectivised path. This meant that it is the overlapping uses of the individual that define a space’s overarching public, consensus-based psychogeography.

The forced nature of the spatial experience in film becomes paramount when considering the impact that cinematic landscapes have on the spectator’s real-world experiences. Often, a film set in a material space like Los Angeles is the initial point of contact for that spectator and the city. These first moments are crucial to the shape that psychogeography can take, as they are the time when the spectator’s vision is *least* mediated. Although

the film itself will present a heavily shaded and fragmented impression of the city, the initial contact will always be the most pure for the spectator. Cinema, as a point of virtual contact, will largely be the first experience that many spectators have of certain places. Although they may go into a certain setting with ideas about what a location is like, their primary experience will always be the measure by which all future contact is held to. Artists like Coppola are in a position of ideological power: their works are formative geographic mediations, shading the spectator's psychogeography. This has significant impact on psychogeography because of the human weakness for expectation, repetition and rhythm. Expectation and repetition are crucial, not only in this inquiry, but in all areas of the study of subjectivity. This is because, as will be demonstrated in this paper, the subjective human experience is powerfully sculpted by these elements. However, it serves the project at hand to momentarily consider the landscape behind the screen, and the spectator's relationship to it.

Through the Looking Glass and into the Screen

While architectural theory is illuminating when applied to film, it must be admitted that few architectural theorists (with the exception of Walter Benjamin) were writing with such parallel aims in mind. However, through examining the spectatorial dynamic, several authors have begun to excavate the important similarities between architectural and film critique.¹² Chief amongst this body of research is Anne Friedberg's work in *The Virtual Window*, an examination of the spectator's historical relationship with windows, screens, frames, paintings, computers and the cinema.¹³ Although the text covers many spectatorial dynamics, the primary metaphor she sketches is an important and illuminating one: the spectator, staring out into a landscape.

Friedberg's book stands out due to its execution and its conclusion: drawing on historical contexts, she brings the traditional figure of the spectator into crisis. Her text works against the general understanding of the spectator, a viewer staring at a screen that seems impenetrable, like a submarine window.¹⁴ This ontological relationship has been present from the inception of critical film theory, in particular Lacanian psychoanalysis.¹⁵ Indeed, psychoanalytic theorists stress the distance between the viewer and the screen (as-a-mirror) in order to demonstrate the twin distance between subject and ideal-self.¹⁶ Although she aligns herself as a historian rather than a philosopher, Anne Friedberg puts this relationship into crisis by interrogating the teleology of spectatorial relationships and proposes a new model of spectatorship.

In the traditional view, the vertical planes of window, painting, cinema screen and computer collapse into the same basic spectatorial relationship, the dominant axiom being that each grew from the one before.¹⁷ The glass window was both formative of and replaced by the painting, which in turn was replaced by film and then the computer screen. In theory, the relationship between art object and spectator is one wherein the spectator stares blankly at an image or object. However, as Friedberg objects, this line of reasoning flattens out the object the spectator beholds onto a two-dimensional plane. There is no sense, she argues, in the work of architectural theorists like Corbusier who align a window as another form of painting. She points out that such accounts overlook a key element: regardless of the framing device (screen, window or painting), there must be something behind it. "The screen functions as an architectonic element," Friedberg writes, "opening the materiality of built space to virtual apertures in an architecture of spectatorship."¹⁸ The frame always holds a diorama, not a picture. Even a screen, a flat plane, is a *virtual* window. These windows, even virtual ones, act as:

an opening, an aperture for light and ventilation. It opens, it closes; it separates the spaces of here and there, inside and outside, in front of and behind. The window opens onto a three-dimensional world beyond: it is a membrane where surface meets depth, where transparency meets its barriers.¹⁹

For Friedberg, the frame must be considered the crucial element of art: the organising principle that marshals the new waves of digital media and postmodern collage into an experience for the viewer. It is the frame that corrals the immaterial into a window, an opening to another world. However, this is not the limit of the frame's importance. Friedberg's work considers the ways in which visual media have changed the way that people see the world. In this sense, she examines a frame both literal and figurative: the frame which encapsulates art has become the frame through which the spectator sees the world.

Friedberg is not the only author who saw the importance of the frame. In *What is Philosophy?* (1991), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari put forward the following: "The first architectural gesture is acted upon the earth: it is our grave or our foundation. A plane against a surface of variable curvature, the first frame is excavation."²⁰ All architecture and all art, in this sense, is a kind of framing device. Humans have portioned off the earth, our cities, our homes and our experiences via frames. For Deleuze and Guattari, all art derives from the impulse to organise the earth.²¹ The frame is crucial because it focuses our attention, our sensory organs; it sets the

stage for art. In essence, the frame is what delineates an art object from the rest of the world. Deleuze and Guattari suggested that this indicates a human tendency to transform everything into a frame, as part of the impulse towards art.²² The assertion of a universal “will to art” is undoubtedly extreme. However, that there is an impulse to frame is not so outrageous when considered in the light of visual processing. The assertions made by Friedberg, Deleuze and Guattari have an important basis in the human body. The frame functions as an aperture, and we naturally seek such apertures out, because the frame serves a physiological barrier that aids visual processing. The frame contains eye movement, restricting saccadic jumping to the perimeter of the artwork.²³ A framed text is one that our eyes instinctively refuse to look away from, a window into another landscape that holds our focus in a way the material, unframed world never could.

The frame in Friedberg, Deleuze and Guattari’s work represents a barrier between the virtual and the actual. However, the strength of this barrier may be called into question, particularly in the age of Instagram. A quick online scan of personal essays and opinion pieces reveals an underlying hum of anxiety over this perceived collapse.²⁴ While much of the academic work on contemporary, everyday self-portraiture focuses on its role as an overlapping assemblage of cultural meanings and identity work, there is little discussion of the role of the frame.²⁵ In addition to the “selfie” being a mode of self-representation, it can also be seen as an everyday method of turning one’s life into images, and vice versa. Applications such as Instagram and other social networking platforms are a chance for people to recreate the frame. In such programs, people take a material space and frame it, usually while inserting themselves into the image. The selfie is, in this sense, about letting the spectator enter the frame, by concurrently breaking it down and then reconstructing it with the spectator behind it. This allows the psychogeography of film to infect the material world, intruding and blurring upon the line between illusion and reality. However, this is not the only way that small screen and mobile technology alters the landscape. Their common usage also brings the frame into crisis by revealing how fragile this separatory device is.

Mobile screen technologies like iPhones have both broken the frame and endeavour to reaffirm it. Like the “will to art” that Deleuze and Guattari outline, the tiny cameras we carry around respond to and reflect a desire to reframe the world. They allow us to reconstruct and reorganise the landscape’s artistic interpretation to better reflect our psychogeography. While de Certeau’s populace defined their spaces by their own individual experiences and expectations, mobile technology now allows us to create artefacts and evidence for each person’s own psychogeographic impression. In

the modern age, each agent's journey is not just experienced, but recorded. Their lived geographic encounters are then uploaded in the form of photos, Facebook's "check-in" function and the social media platform Four-square, amongst myriad other methods. It is this exact behaviour that is documented and critiqued in Sofia Coppola's *The Bling Ring*. *The Bling Ring* invites the spectator to read "selfies" as akin to self-paparazzi. This can be seen in the opening sequence of the film, which juxtaposes an onslaught of photos of celebrities with the ring member's Facebook pages. Indeed, the characters often go to clubs with the sole purpose of photographing themselves there. Their lives are lived *for* the photos they produce. In this way, at least, they are remarkably similar to the celebrities they idolise. In their own way, they are trying to portion off their lives via the frame of digital media. Moreover, it is explicitly stated that the purpose of the robberies that the teens commit is to be submerged in Hollywood's image. When they break and enter into a celebrity's house, their ultimate aim is to break into the Hollywood image-cycle they have observed.

Rather than this being a fictionalised overstatement, these habits of *The Bling Ring*'s titular characters reflect the film's real inspiration. As Coppola reminds us at the outset, the film is based on real events. The main characters are all based on actual people, each of whom took great care to document their lives online prior to their involvement in the robberies. In fact, one of the real-life members of the ring, Alexis Neiers, was part of a reality television show at the time the crimes occurred. For those unfamiliar with the film or the news story upon which it is based, the "ring" were a group of high school students who performed a series of burglaries on celebrities; a crime spree that took the 2008 American media's attention and catapulted each of the real life criminals into the spotlight. True to the realities of being a teenager in the twenty-first century, the film spends much of its time watching them take photographs of themselves and updating their Facebook profiles. Subsequently, all of the houses in *The Bling Ring* function as a metaphor for the permeable frame. Belonging to celebrities born "of the screen," entry to these spaces represents a way to enter the frame and the cinematic world. For the teenage members of the ring, simple ingress into these houses (even an illicit one) presents a way to further pierce the veil between the screen-world and the material world. This practice is furthered by the character's tendency to self-paparazzi and self-promote online. By these turns they transform themselves into celebrities, and thus break the frame both legitimately and illegitimately. Ironically, although Paris Hilton left the keys to her home under her doormat, the robbers already had a key: using the screens of their computers and phones they tracked down her holiday plans, and her address. Within the universe

of *The Bling Ring*, a screen is all one needs to enter the frame.

Seven Counts of Residential Burglary: The Power of Repetition and Expectation

Deleuze and Guattari's work ultimately reveals the impact that the frame has on scopic regimes. They describe a universal will to art, as part of a cerebral desire to organise the earth. However, there are other plausible explanations for the sheer power of the frame. To borrow from Deleuze's later work, I would contend that the capacity of the frame to alter our external world stems not from a will to art, but from the seismic force of *repetition*. Window frames, in any form, introduce the spectator to a landscape. In the case of virtual landscapes, they are the initial contact between the spectator and this illusory place. For the spectator, the frame delineates material space and film space. While material space is unbound and unspooling, film space is limited into the narrow view of the camera lens. If the landscape of the film is also a material landscape, then the separation between cinema and spectatorial experience is thrown into question. The cause of this collapse is the collision between expectation, repetition and reality. Landscape representation, I would argue, is a similar image to Deleuze's time-image. Deleuze argued that repetition constituted a form of time travel, and was thus a unique time-image.²⁶ Repetition has this capacity, he argued, because it has created an expectation for the future.²⁷ It crafts its own expectation in our minds. The filmic landscape's capacity to alter our lived materiality reveals that this expectation for repetition stays with the spectator long after the aesthetic experience is over.

Deleuze's belief in the power of repetition can be seen explicitly in *The Bling Ring*. Although I will address this shortly in further detail, for the moment a single example from the film serves his point particularly well. Early in the film, the main characters are driving down a street in Los Angeles, intoxicated and singing along to their car stereo. The scene, which fizzles with youthful *jouissance*, is suddenly interrupted when the group accidentally run a red light and end up in a wrenching traffic accident. At first, it would seem that the scene holds little narrative purpose beyond underlining the irresponsibility of the characters. However, later in the film the scene is almost entirely repeated, sans one character. The two leads, Mark and Rebecca, speed down the same street, doing cocaine and singing along to Kanye West. The similarity of cinematic images causes the spectator to suddenly become tense. The repetition forces the spectator to momentarily collapse the sequence back into the initial car accident. The past car wreck hangs like a spectre over the current scene. In the end, one watches the

scene waiting for a disaster that never occurs. The tension that the spectator experiences is due purely to their expectations, which are forged by repetition.

It is through the combined philosophy of de Certeau, Friedberg and Deleuze that we can begin to understand the impact of film on psychogeography. The cinema screen, according to Friedberg, is an open window. Although the “light and air” it lets in are immaterial fragments, they still permeate the spectator’s experience, and thus touch their subjectivity.²⁸ Cinema’s shafts of light curl into the spectator’s mind, opening them up to the virtual landscape. As a primary contact point between people and place, this filmic experience indelibly informs the behaviour of all non-native explorers. What I mean, put simply, is this: once the spectator makes contact with a filmic landscape, this is a lens through which they compare all material space. To put it into Deleuzian terms, each future encounter with the space will essentially collapse back to the first (in this instance filmic) encounter, which becomes the yardstick that the space is measured by.²⁹ The filmed space, if it is the first time the spectator encounters that space, becomes a psychogeographic image. Filmic landscapes and landscapes that have been filmed coalesce to become a synthesised, rhizomatic abstraction for the spectator. Each touches and permeates the other, creating an altered sense of place that invades both our real-world and cinematic impressions of place. However, the question still stands: why would the spectator hang on to the filmic representation? Why would expectation have the impact that I imply it does?

From a psychological perspective, we cannot overestimate the importance of initial sight. The first sensory contact between person and place is crucial in setting expectations, learned behaviour patterns, affect and atmosphere. This is due to the nature of learning and a phenomenon called “priming.” From a neurological perspective learning is the forging of new links between neurons in an effort to create a chain or circuit. Each link is generated by an *action potential*, a brief reversal of the electric polarisation in the membrane of a presynaptic neuron.³⁰ The action potential triggers the release of neurotransmitter chemicals, each of which has different effects and works as a signal to the neighbouring neuron. In plain English: a spark at one end of the neuron causes a channel to form between that neuron and another. Chemical signals cross this channel, constituting the exchange of basic information. An action potential is thought to be a single “bit” of information, like a single note played by a single violin amongst the maelstrom of an orchestra.³¹ If a neuron’s action potential is used for the same effect often, it forms into a *long-term potential*. This is a more inviolable bond, a kind of hard-wiring in the brain. The brain creates these struc-

tures in an effort to save time and energy. The difference between action potential thinking and long-term potential thinking can be easily felt: for example, it is the experiential distance one feels between making your first origami crane and your hundredth. This solidification of neural circuitry is known as priming. Once a concept is substantiated into a long-term potential chain, it requires fewer neurons to perceive and/or experience it.³² The idea that we are the sum of our experiences is not so far off after all: our brains are programmed to repeat experiences, behaviours and feelings based on prior cognitive events. For the sake of efficiency, our minds endeavour to refer the lived moment back to already learned information. This facet of the mind partially explains exactly *why* images are so powerful. Once an image takes hold in the brain, we are designed to replicate it.

The first brush between subject and landscape, even if it occurs in a purely visual, illusory capacity, is an important one. After this contact, the spectator's mind is thirsty for repetition of the stimulus. For the sake of efficiency, our minds attempt to collapse every experience down to our expectation of the experience. We are quite literally primed to see things the same way we first saw them, due to the design that allows us to learn. This quirk of evolution has a number of slightly odd follow-on effects, such as confirmation bias and change blindness. Confirmation bias "connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand."³³ It is a borderline universal phenomenon that manifests itself in a tendency to round-down one's perceptions to match their expectations. Change blindness is another, delightfully bizarre example of this tendency, thought to be caused by a top-down cognition disrupting visual perception.³⁴ By top-down, I refer to executive, conceptual thought overtaking the information of the senses. In the experience of change blindness, a person loses the ability to perceive quite dramatic changes in the visual field due to their pre-existing expectations of how their environment is should be. In both filmic and naturalistic material settings, experimental participants have missed major changes in the environment.³⁵ Change blindness is, at its core, an unconscious confusion between the virtual construct of the world and the world itself. This indicates that not only is it possible that the mind can give primacy to a virtual world like a motion picture, but that the spectator *would not be entirely aware that that is what is happening*. These tendencies lead psychological researcher and philosopher Thomas Metzinger to conclude that in all likelihood, expectation constitutes a vast majority of our perceptions, with sensory data providing the remainder.³⁶ Expectation becomes key, in both material and immaterial worlds. For this reason, the initial contact a spectator has with a space can constitute the frame through which they will forever see the ge-

ography. Consequently, it is of utmost importance to isolate elements of priming in films which depict real locations.

In *Difference and Repetition* (1968), Deleuze struggles with the tension between the actual and the virtual. Repetition and difference become useful for Deleuze, ways to parse the changes in appearance that would otherwise be lost to time.³⁷ He argues that the human understanding of temporality is one made in passive synthesis.³⁸ Repetition has no true impact, Deleuze states, but does have a direct effect on the subjective expectation of time. This inexorable alteration to our expectations fundamentally changes the perceived passage of time, forming a new temporality. “This is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the mind,” Deleuze states.³⁹ If we take Deleuze’s use of “mind” as a synonym for consciousness, Deleuze’s philosophy is largely in accord with neuroscience. The reframing that repetition and expectation causes in the brain occurs primarily in an unconscious state. Because of the brain’s tendency towards efficiency, this passive synthesis of temporal events constitutes not only our expectations but our experiences. Events like change blindness occur because our synthesised temporality dictates that they will. These expectations of pattern and rhythm are their own frame: a prism through which we bend reality.

The phenomenon of repetition and replication of images is a major theme in *The Bling Ring*. The members of the ring are both inundated with images, and obsessed with them. In a scene prior to their first major robbery, there is a brief montage of photos of celebrities. Perhaps meant to signify their internet browsing habits, the short moment communicates the inundation of images that modern children are exposed to. These images are repeated later, when we see them pasted all over the bedroom walls of the main characters. Two members of the ring, Rebecca and Mark, bond over magazine browsing. Coppola makes it clear within the first act of the film that these teens have been seemingly brainwashed by the bombardment of photos of celebrity life. Living so close to these actors, and being so visually familiar with them, leads the teens to mistake the *image* of celebrity life as form of reality that may be emulated. At one point, Rebecca, Mark and a third friend sit on the beach, discussing their future plans. Rebecca states that she wants to go to the New York School of Design because “all the girls from *The Hills* went there.”

The Bling Ring is a film that toys with the interplay between expectations and reality. Depicting actual events and being filmed in the houses where said events occurred, it truly problematises the separation between actual and virtual landscapes. It also shows how the experience of a space becomes the frame in which our psychogeographic impression is constructed. For example, the film sets up a visual call-back to another film

about problematising Hollywood the suburb: David Lynch's *Mulholland Drive* (2001). As the two leaders of the ring, Rebecca and Mark, drive in another stolen car, the headlights cut out a swathe of the famous drive in shots almost identical to the opening title in Lynch's film.

It is a visual mirror that, for those who have seen *Mulholland Drive*, cannot be denied. Although there are differences between the two images, any spectator who has already seen Lynch's film has neurons primed and ready for recursion. Even the soundtrack, which is dominated by popular music, switches to a score that sounds similar to the opening xylophones and strings in *Mulholland Drive*. This mirror of earlier film aesthetics dramatises the importance of the first contact. It also aligns Coppola's film as one which will similarly examine Los Angeles as a place. It creates an expectation of allusion for the educated spectator, an important precursor to critical moments of repetition. This is hardly the first moment of recursion in the film, however it sets up the text as an explicitly psychogeographic one.

The repetition of images, as shown in *The Bling Ring*, shows us how compelling and influential the image can be on the landscape. The recursion of filmic images and people's expectations create echoes back into reality. For example, in one scene Rebecca looks out of a car window as the steady beat of Palm trees flowing by forms a visual pattern. As Deleuze sets out in *Difference and Repetition*, patterns, in the sense of landscapes, are rooted in the future: they create expectations for what is to come.⁴⁰ Spectators of *The Bling Ring* who travel to Los Angeles will now expect not only palm trees, but palms that rhythmically line the streets of Beverly Hills. As each enters the sight of the spectator, the expectation for another intensifies. Each tree is its own part of a tempo. This is made explicit within the film as the fronds passing by create a rhythmic pattern of light and sound. If the windscreen, as Friedberg argued, is the frame through which the spectator places cinematically derived expectation onto material places, then the palms of Beverly Hills stand as testament. They monumentalise the collision of expectation and the actual, allowing a spectator to momentarily confuse cinema and reality.

Los Angeles is a perfect tool to analyse the impact of the frame and the screen on the landscape, which explains the significant prior research that takes it as a case study.⁴¹ In examining Los Angeles, Jean Louis Baudrillard described the place as one where "the cinema extends outwards into our urban reflexes."⁴² Friedberg herself has done considerable work on the impact that shifting economic conditions and television had on Los Angeles' "screen culture." She concluded that the dispersion of cinema's audience in post-war America and the subsequent influx of drive-ins, open air theatres and other technology reflect the fact that Los Angeles

opens itself as a permeable city, one which aims to puncture the screen. The city's reliance on automobiles is enlisted as testament to this; "the windscreen," she writes, "is the permeable tension between the materiality of built space and the dematerialised imaginary that cinema provides."⁴³ Given that Los Angeles is the beating heart of the film industry, the distinction between the city and its filmic representation has always been more reflexive than other cities. In *Spaces of Modernity*, Edward Dimendberg considers the impact of film noir on the city's self-conception, and how the screen depiction of Los Angeles has shaped the city. He outlines clear patterns of recursion, wherein representation on the screen carves a mark into the city itself.⁴⁴ In essence, Los Angeles is a city made in its own image, one where the rupture of film and reality is at its peak. This idea is actively explored in *The Bling Ring*, by looking at the impact of the digital image.⁴⁵

The Bling Ring examines the impact of Hollywood's image on Hollywood's psychogeography. Following from the work of de Certeau, Deleuze and the nature of neuroanatomic learning, this is not such an outlandish idea. If space can be produced by the people who experience it, then the psychogeography of film space has an impact on our perception of material space. An aspect of this influence that *The Bling Ring* grapples with is the specific impact of cellular phone technology on Hollywood's image. It makes clear that the collision between the virtual and the real has only become more significant with the introduction of filmmaking technology into everyday life. We are now able to film and photograph our material spaces from mobile phones, heralding a new wave of framed fragmentation of the real. The frame is now everywhere, and everything is framed. I would contend that this has led to an uncontrolled, wild collapsing of material and virtual geography, so that the two become an essentially indistinguishable psychogeographic impression for the spectator. Furthermore, this collapse is being aided and abetted by mobile technology.

Beverly Hills Caught on Film: Framing the Bling Ring

"Think of them as Marc Jacobins, an army of Juicy-sweat pants-clad revolutionaries looking to dismantle the notion of elite through conspicuous—and in the case of the Bling Ring, illegal—consumption. Their desire is . . . to feel equal to the rich and famous"
 – Elissa Strauss⁴⁶

If *The Virgin Suicides* was about escaping the end of innocence through

death, then *The Bling Ring* is about the death of innocence from a modern cultural toxin. Coppola finds this threat so pervasive that the power of digital images seems to plight Los Angeles itself like a psychological analogue to its earthquakes and smog. In considering the thoroughly millennial crimes of the ring, Coppola's film explores a cultural poison that stems from the digital dissemination of images.⁴⁷ The power of these images, when repeated, is to alter social perception and expectation.

The images of Hollywood have inexorably poisoned the minds of the ring's members. The film cleverly depicts a more realist Los Angeles than is commonly seen in Hollywood cinema: Beverly Hills opulence is juxtaposed with the dingy suburban reality of nearby Calabasas, where the teens are from. At the beginning of the film, it is made clear that the group feels short-changed to live in such proximity to glamour, while still inhabiting decidedly pedestrian conditions. Their own expectations are inextricably tied to Hollywood and its image: they walk through Hollywood Boulevard, thus they should be stars. Through the repetition of certain images (which, as the film shows, the teens are immersed in through phones and the internet), they have been primed for a specific experience of the Los Angeles landscape, one of celebrity and glamour. Throughout the film, they begin to repeat these images: being photographed in popular nightclubs, wearing designer clothes, driving convertible cars with the top down on Sunset Boulevard. That their actions are illicit does not seem overly important to the group; the replication of these images is of primary importance. Instead, by recreating the imagistic impression of celebrity, it seems they find a cure to teenage malaise. Indeed, Mark says at the start of the film that he felt insecure because he wasn't "an A-List looking guy," and through the robberies, he becomes a mostly happy, confident person. Furthermore, when the group rob Lindsay Lohan's house, there is a long, slow-motion shot of Rebecca putting on Lohan's perfume. The shot ends on Rebecca staring into a mirror, perhaps finally feeling that, framed by Lohan's vanity dresser, she has become the image she wanted.

As mentioned above, *The Bling Ring* repeats several of its own scenes to underline the role that image and repetition play in forming our mental images and expectations. Its opening is almost disorienting, throwing the viewer into clips of the ring members discussing their pursuits, moments which occur chronologically at the close of the picture. Interviews with Nikki and Mark occur twice in the film. On first sight, these scenes seem to aim to contextualise the ensuing events. They portend that the ring will commit crimes, will become infamous, and will get caught. As signposting, these moments point towards Deleuze's notion of repetition-as-time-travel. However, the spectator can only know that these clips are repeats on their sec-

ond airing. It is important to note that their second appearances are not *exact* copies, but clearly alternate takes of the same scenes. They become a kind of simulacra-in-miniature, their repetition highlighting the few differences that exist between them. The spectator is held captive by their learned expectation that these two scenes are identical. Because they are not, the changes become stark. For example, on the second appearance, Mark's interview is lengthened, as the journalist points out that he is now a celebrity in his own right. The mention that he has hundreds of Facebook friend requests further underscores this. Yet Mark and the reporter make a point of decrying how shallowly he is being viewed in the public eye. He is nothing more than an image, an abstraction that people would like to digitally observe. This is part of the film's larger morality, one that rebukes the pursuit of images by pointing out their flatness.

The film plays explicitly with the confusion between virtual images and actual reality through the pseudo-religious education received by some of the ring's members. Nikki's mother homeschools two of the girls via *The Law of Attraction*. On screen, the teens are taught to manifest positive personalities and goals (two things they are sorely lacking) through the use of vision boards. These boards, popular with those who follow the teachings of *The Secret*, are literally about turning one's life into images—and vice versa. Through the repeated exposure to the images on the board, exponents of *The Secret* believe their life will begin to resemble their dreams. Of course, vision boards are, when viewed through a psychological lens, a method of “hacking” the brain's confirmation bias into rounding one's perception of their experiences into their desired perceptions, as has been noted by both psychologists and scientifically-minded journalists.⁴⁸ In fact, the belief that an image of a bright future will manifest itself through such methods is suspected by social psychologists to be a source of modern malaise.⁴⁹ The ring's belief in celebrity image perhaps stems from this education in images as talismans, as tools for building a better reality. The members of the ring are dissatisfied with the reality of their existence, and instead prefer the images of Hollywood's lifestyle.

This confusion is played out to its fullest extent through the houses that the ring targets. These huge, cavernous spaces do not look like people's homes at all. The spectator never sees a kitchen, a coaster or any corner that does not look like a photo from a magazine. The daring behind *The Bling Ring* comes from its use of houses and settings that look fake, but are quite real. The celebrity houses in the film are not just particularly glamorous homes, they are the actual houses of the people who are being robbed on screen.

The mansion of Paris Hilton, for example, is both material reality and a

scenography reconstituted into cinematic illusion. Its presence on the screen is being used as authentication of the mythology of Paris Hilton's celebrity. Its strip club atmosphere has been built with the specifications of Hilton's personal story in mind. With a built-in pole dancing stage and an in-house nightclub room, the house supports the fiction of Hilton's sex-bomb persona. Echoing the press clippings on Hilton's walls and her pillows (each bearing a silkscreened image of her face), her home illustrates exactly how Hilton achieved her level of celebrity. Hilton constructed frames around her image and her most intimate moments, and fame soon followed. Thus her home, where it is impossible to discern what is real and what is set dressing, illuminates the extent of modern permeation. In its dual role as film set and domestic abode, the mansion exists liminally between reality and cinema.

The permeation of spectator into screen, and material into virtual, is marked by the group's literal (and illicit) entry into mansions through huge framed-glass windows. The first house they rob is made almost entirely of just such doors and windows. It looks, for all intents and purposes, like a frame into Hollywood's image. This architectural motif is repeated in another burglary, one that marks a turning point in the film. In a breath-taking, real-time longshot, the home of Audrina Partridge sits like a jewel in the Hollywood hills.

As the two leaders of the ring break in and begin searching for valuables, the house (which is cut through with huge, exhibitionistic windows) lights up and is revealed like a kind of life-sized doll house. The camera zooms in *slightly* throughout the long take, though the physical distance between the audience and the thieves is maintained. This distance serves a figurative purpose, as it provides the spectator with an outside perspective of the events on screen. This is a sucker-punch moment, when the criminality of the ring's actions is finally and explicitly stated. As we watch them ransack the house, they are far enough from the camera that we cannot see their faces, nor hear their conversation. In short, they look like thieves. Previously, the burglaries were filmed intimately close to the group, who browsed through other people's wardrobes as though they were shopping at the mall. This enfolded the spectator directly into the action, as though they themselves were another member of the ring. More importantly, the children's attitude meant that the robberies didn't *feel* criminal. Yet here, stripped of their childlike naiveté, they are suddenly transformed into crooks. The spectator, who may have sympathised with the ring, is now shown them stripped of glamour and revealed to be the commonest of common thieves.

The *mise-en-scène* of the shot puts a wide band of darkness around

the mansion, acting as a frame to the house's windows. The camera slowly pushes in, yet always maintains a significant distance. This means the audience is forced to strain to parse what they are looking at, to squint into the aperture of Partridge's home, while the visual underscores its own metaphor for the screen. It is no coincidence that it is this particular robbery that marks the peak of the ring's success. By entering the house, they are finally and thoroughly embroiled into the *image* of Hollywood. In accord with Friedberg's intersecting relations of frame, window and screen, this tracking shot collapses all these relationships into a single puncture between virtual and actual. The glass doors into Partridge's house act as windows and as frames that the audience sees the actors through. The house is a metaphor for the screen, and now the protagonists have finally, illicitly entered. Yet rather than this being a moment of triumph, the stark criminality of their actions is pivotal.

This scene sets out to reproach any audience members who sympathised or identified with the characters. The desire to live inside Hollywood, to enter the screen, is shown as immoral and not glamorous. Indeed, it is almost immediately after this robbery that the ring members find themselves suddenly infamous and under investigation. It is revealed that Partridge's home is equipped with its own cameras, which have captured their sojourn through the frame. Images of Mark and Rebecca's robbery are seen from the perspective of security guards, and then from a meta-spectatorial shot as they play on television screens. By entering the screen, the teens have inexorably incriminated themselves. While the robberies in Hilton's mansion seemingly kept them under the radar, the repercussions to their crimes begin and end with that one long take.

By the third act, the ring has fully entered Hollywood's image. This is most keenly felt in a bold slow motion shot of them walking on the Hollywood Boulevard, wearing designer clothes and drinking ice coffee. The costumes and props of celebrity, when combined with the slightly lowered camera angle, makes the shot almost indistinguishable (though more stylish) from a paparazzi set. It positions the group as finally becoming the image themselves. Of course, the ring's entrance into Hollywood also welcomes their doom. The police close in and begin arresting the teens. This in turn lets the Hollywood screen consume *them*, as signified by their sudden appearance on gossip websites and E! Access Hollywood interviews. The cycle of repetition, of consumed images being replicated in the city, is complete.

The stylistic choices that Coppola makes after the Partridge robbery further underscore the collision of Hollywood the image and Hollywood the place for the group. Once the robbers have entered the frame, the film is

quick to collapse the distance between them and their idols. In previous club scenes, the group seemed childish and out of place, obsessively photographing themselves as though they could not believe they were there. Trying, in their own way, to make their lived experience mirror the image of expectation. After the Partridge robbery, Coppola shoots their celebration of successful heists in graceful slow motion, transforming their bodies into cinematic spectacle. The degree of difference between Hollywood and the ring is further diminished by the introduction of an interesting parallel: Lindsay Lohan's arrest for shoplifting. Coppola aligns the real-world footage of news coverage of Lohan's theft with the Ring's fictionalised footage. It is only after Lohan's arrest that the ring targets her home, signalling the final collapse between virtual and actual. The separation between the ring and Lohan is minimal, all are young, ambitious criminals. The group looks so at ease in the homes of celebrities (who, as it turns out, are thieves themselves), and the puncture appears complete. The diegetic blurring of material and immaterial is mirrored by the film's interplay between fictional and nonfictional. Once Coppola begins using "real" news footage, the spectator is forcibly reminded of the reality of the plot. The interplay of fabrication and truth utterly abolishes the spectator's assurance that it is "just a movie," and thus further punctures the virtual/actual divide.

It should be noted that Coppola does not seem happy about this rupture. Coppola has said in the press around the movie that she fears the impact of technology and celebrity culture on modern youth.⁵⁰ Much of the anxiety that Coppola expresses over screen technology may well be a fear for her Hollywood world's sovereignty. In the film, she explicitly positions herself as a part of the Hollywood image in the opening credit sequence. When her title card comes onscreen, it is playfully intruded upon by a diamond necklace with the words "Ritch Bitch" spelled out in pink. While she may simply be poking fun at her own fame and image, the joke also places her squarely within the world that the ring aimed to infiltrate. This is not an illusory worry, but a real threat made material by screen technology. *The Bling Ring* demonises those who enter the film's landscape, although it is sympathetic to why one would want to. While Coppola and *The Bling Ring* may wish that one can never truly enter Hollywood's image (as the narrative makes clear), with the rise of Facebook and Instagram, anyone can construct a screen around their lives. Coppola keenly feels the impact of Hollywood's image on its psychogeography, a shift that makes her anxious. The impetus for the film's morality is the fact that this is a very real concern for those who live in Hollywood. Hollywood is now an image that both sprawls out and draws in from the screen, caught in a self-reflexive cycle of change. The image, repeated, becomes the landscape, and in turn that

landscape is filmed into an image. This cycle of repetition is not driven by the expectation of Los Angeles natives, but by the hordes of global spectators. Hollywood is, thanks to its own constant photographic self-capture, an open frame.

For the first time, the shift in our collective psychogeography (that has been cued by filmic geography) can be truly seen in the landscape. The social technology outlined above has sped up the collaborative, rhizomatic change in our perceptions. On both a neurological and philosophical level, repetition becomes expectation, which becomes perception. For this reason, the psychogeography of film is not just relevant, but crucial. Far more than it once did, digital landscapes are directly shaping our expectation of material landscapes. This in turn inexorably alters our perceptions of the space. The uncontrolled collision between material and virtual worlds that Coppola seems to fear supports the idea that filmic psychogeography alters material spaces in a tangible way. Films, by often being the point of initial contact between space and spectator, neurally prime the audience for a certain kind of psychogeographic experience. The use of modern mobile and small screen technology supports the creation and *repetition* of this experience. I would suggest that it is for this reason that the impact of psychogeography on our world is increasing, perhaps exponentially. Through the seemingly insouciant Instagram, virtual and actual landscapes have become connected in a recursive circuit. A film like *The Bling Ring* changes our expectation of the material, which alters our perceptions of said material, which alters our own personal transcription of the material back into the virtual. Which is to say, I am far more likely to Instagram rows of Palm Trees in Beverly Hills for having seen *The Bling Ring*. Perhaps this circuit will seem trivial to those looking for radical shifts in culture, architecture, film and psychology. What I hope to have demonstrated is that this small, frivolous loop is a symptom of such a shift. That filmic landscapes matter reveals the collapse of the virtual/actual divide, and shows us how truly pierced the screen is.

A shift is currently occurring in the relationship between spectators and screen, and in all likelihood this shift will continue. Mobile technology has led to an exponential rise of consumption and spread of images, and of the spectator directly relating the image to reality. This change is having a tangible effect on psychogeography, cinema, and the spectator's relationship to both. The new spectator frames their own life, often as a mode of replicating cinematic images. These images then go on to be recycled, redistributed, reframed, adapted and copied until they have sculpted the culture and geography that surrounds them. Films that are preoccupied with landscapes are being lent an unintended post-hoc realism. The spectator now

wishes to “go to the movies” in a *real* way: a trip to Los Angeles necessitates an Instagram of palm trees. This paper has considered how the material and immaterial bleed into one another on a primarily philosophical level. However, this is not the full extent of this collapse. Consequently, the thesis must return to delve deeper into the psychological reception of film, so as to better understand the spectator’s misrecognition of the image as material landscape.

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NOTES

- ¹ Guy Debord, “Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography,” in *Critical Geography: Collected Readings*, ed. Harald Bauder and Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro (Kewlna: Praxis, 2008), 23–33.
- ² Giuliana Bruno, *Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film* (New York: Verso, 2002), 98.
- ³ Tom Gunning, “Landscape and the Fantasy of Moving Pictures: Early Cinema’s Phantom Ride,” in *Cinema and Landscape*, ed. Graham Harper and Jonathan Rayner (Bristol: Intellect, 2010), 38, 48–49.
- ⁴ Gilles Deleuze, “The Actual and the Virtual,” in *Dialogues II*, trans. Claire Parnet (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 148–52; Slavoj Žižek, “From Virtual Reality to the Virtualization of Reality,” in *Electronic Culture: Technology and Visual Representation*, ed. Tim Druckrey (New York: Aperture, 1996), 290–95; Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2002); Lev Manovich, “Database as Symbolic Form,” in *Database Aesthetics: Art in the Age of Information Overflow*, ed. Victoria Vesna. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2007), 39–60.
- ⁵ Bruno, *Atlas of Emotion*, 2. This is admittedly a significant extension of the original term coined by Guy Debord, but one that has been productively used in Bruno’s work.
- ⁶ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
- ⁷ Anne Friedberg, *The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft* (Cambridge: M.I.T Press, 2004).
- ⁸ There are indeed a great number of papers which consider other potential “producers” of space. Chief amongst them is the work of Henri Lefebvre in his *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Roland Barthes, “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative,” trans. Lionel Duisit, *New Literary History* 6, no. 2 (Winter, 1975): 187; and Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge and Power,” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Press, 1984).

- ⁹ De Certeau, *Practice*, 94.
- ¹⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, "Structures, Habitus, Practices," in *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 52–65.
- ¹¹ De Certeau, *Practice*, 115.
- ¹² Chris Lukinbeal and Stefan Zimmermann, "Film Geography: A New Subfield (Filmgeographie: Ein Neues Teilgebiet)," *Erdkunde* 60, no. 4 (2006): 315–25; David B. Clarke, *The Cinematic City* (London; New York: Routledge: 1997); Robert Shannon Peckham, "Landscape in Film," in *A Companion to Cultural Geography*, ed. James S. Duncan, Nuala C. Johnson and Richard H. Schein (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 420–29; Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media*, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Edward J. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Peter Wollen, *Paris Hollywood: Writings on Film* (New York: Verso, 2002); Victor Burgin, *In Different Spaces: Place and Memory in Visual Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Edward Dimendberg, *Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
- ¹³ Anne Friedberg, *The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
- ¹⁴ Carl Plantinga, *Moving Viewers: American Film and the Spectator's Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 23.
- ¹⁵ Todd McGowan, *The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 14.
- ¹⁶ A classical text demonstrating this popular ethos is Christian Metz, "Photography and Fetish," *October* 34 (1985): 81–90.
- ¹⁷ Friedberg, *Virtual Window*, 47–49, 51.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 150.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.
- ²⁰ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 64.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 183.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 65.
- ²³ This can be seen in a number of eye tracking studies, which record where exactly in the visual field one's eye is focused, for example Andrew Duchowski, *Eye Tracking Methodology: Theory and Practice* (London: Springer, 2007), 12.
- ²⁴ For interested readers, I recommend the following articles: Russell W. Belk, "Extended Self in a Digital World," *Journal of Consumer Research* 40, no. 3 (October 2013): 477–500; James Franco, "The Meanings of the Selfie," *The New York Times*, December 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/arts/the-meanings-of-the-selfie.html?_r=0; Pamela Rutledge, "Making Sense of Selfies," *Psychology*, July 6, 2013, <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/positively-media/201307/making-sense-selfies>; Allison Leshowitz, "We Are All Guilty Of Cre-

ating Our Internet Image,” *Honesty for Breakfast*, February 17, 2014, <http://www.honestyforbreakfast.com/we-are-all-guilty-of-creating-our-internet-image>.

- ²⁵ These accounts of contemporary self-portraiture and selfies constitute an emerging, fascinating field. I refer here specifically to Nancy Van House, “Personal Photography, Digital Technologies and the Uses of the Visual,” *Visual Studies* 26, no. 2 (June 2011): 125–34; and Jose Van Dijck, “Digital photography: Communication, Identity, Memory,” *Visual Communication* 7, no. 1 (2008): 57–76.
- ²⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 76.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 77, 91.
- ²⁸ Friedberg, *Virtual Window*, 150.
- ²⁹ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 295.
- ³⁰ John Eberhard, *Architecture and the Brain: A New Knowledge Base from Neuroscience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 185.
- ³¹ Eberhard, *Architecture and the Brain*, 118.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 120.
- ³³ Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,” *Review of General Psychology* 2, no. 2 (1998): 175.
- ³⁴ Daniel Simmons and Daniel Levin, “Change Blindness,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 1, no. 7 (1997): 261–67.
- ³⁵ For example, one experiment found that the spectator did not detect when an actor in a film was unexpectedly changed mid-conversion. See Daniel Simmons and Daniel Levin, “Failure to Detect Changes to Attended Objects in Motion Pictures,” *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review* 4 (1997): 501–506. Rather than this being an anomaly born of cinematic conventions, the effect was reported to a greater degree when the participant’s conversation partner was swapped in reality; see Daniel Levin et al., “Memory for Centrally Attended Changing Objects in an Incidental Real-World Change Detection Paradigm,” *British Journal of Psychology* 93 (2002): 289–302.
- ³⁶ Thomas Metzinger, *The Ego Tunnel* (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 46.
- ³⁷ James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 85.
- ³⁸ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 70.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 70.
- ⁴¹ See Soja, *Thirdspace*; Wollen, *Paris Hollywood*; Dimendberg, *Film Noir*.
- ⁴² Jean Baudrillard and Sylvère Lotringer, *The Ecstasy of Communication*, trans. Bernard and Caroline Schutze (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Autonomedia, 1988), 56.
- ⁴³ Anne Friedberg, “Urban Mobility and Cinematic Visuality: The Screens of Los Angeles—Endless Cinema or Private Telematics,” *Journal of Visual Culture* 1, no. 2 (2002): 186.

- ⁴⁴ Dimendberg, *Film Noir*, 12.
- ⁴⁵ John Hiscock, "Sofia Coppola Interview: 'The Bling Ring isn't my World,'" *The Telegraph*, July 4, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/10126910/Sofia-Coppola-interview-The-Bling-Ring-isnt-my-world.html>; Ryan Gilbey, "Sofia Coppola on The Bling Ring: 'What These Kids Did Really Took Ingenuity,'" *The Guardian*, July 5, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/film/2013/jul/04/sofia-coppola-the-bling-ring-interview>; Richard Prince, "Sofia Copp," *Interview*, August 2013, http://www.interviewmagazine.com/film/sofia-coppola/#_.
- ⁴⁶ Elissa Strauss, "What 'The Bling Ring' Gets Wrong About Valley Girls," *Salon*, June 19, 2013, http://www.salon.com/2013/06/18/what_the_bling_ring_gets_wrong_about_valley_girls/.
- ⁴⁷ For example, the positioning can be seen explicitly in juxtaposition between a quick-fire montage of paparazzi images set to grating digital music, which then cuts to the teenagers googling celebrities addresses to find their next target. This is not the only time that the film sets out an explicit cause-effect image, a Deleuzian action image that makes the celebrity gossip industry itself culpable for the crimes.
- ⁴⁸ Jenna Baddeley, "Embracing the Dark Side: Discerning the Positive Aspects of Sadness, Bereavement, and Other Negative Feelings," *Psychology Today*, November 27, 2009, <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/embracing-the-dark-side/200911/the-law-attraction-science-faith-and-the-cult-positive-thought-p>; Gabriele Oettingen and Doris Mayer, "The Motivating Function of Thinking about the Future: Expectations versus Fantasies," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83, no. 5 (2002): 1198; Heather Barry Kappes and Gabriele Oettingen, "Positive Fantasies about Idealized Futures Sap Energy," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 47, no. 4 (2011): 719–29; Adam Alter, "The Powerlessness of Positive Thinking," *The New Yorker*, February 19, 2014, <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2014/02/the-powerlessness-of-positive-thinking.html>].
- ⁴⁹ Oettingen and Mayer, "The Motivating Function," 1198; Kappes and Oettingen, "Positive Fantasies," 720.
- ⁵⁰ Gilbey, "Sofia Coppola on The Bling Ring."