In Search of a Schema: Derrida and the Rhythm of Hospitality

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For Derrida, hospitality is constituted by an aporia: unconditional hospitality and conditional hospitality are simultaneously contradictory and mutually necessary, heterogeneous and indissociable. Though not paralysing action, this aporia qua aporia should nevertheless be impassable. Yet Derrida enigmatically proposes that the distinction between unconditional and conditional hospitality “requires us to determine what would be called, in Kantian language (in an approximate and analogical way, since in the strict sense they are in fact excluded in this case, and this exclusion needs to be thought about), intermediate schemas, ultimately allowing us to ‘interven[e] in the condition of hospitality in the name of the unconditional.’ The purpose of this article will be to explore what Derrida could have meant by his invocation of the Kantian schema: its relationship to Kant’s thought, its possible function with respect to hospitality, and what in particular might be able to occupy the schematic role. In so doing, a step is taken not to resolve or transcend but to fulfil the aporia of hospitality and thereby move toward a truly Derridean politics.

To start, a quick refresher on the aporia of hospitality according to Derrida. Unconditional hospitality requires one “to give the new arrival all of one’s home and oneself, to give him or her one’s own, our own, without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfilment of even the smallest condition.” This immediately runs up against a problem: in giving the guest
the home itself, the host gives up the very capacity to host, a capacity that presumes control over the relinquished home. Thus unconditional hospitality is, strictly speaking, “impossible” (though it must be remembered that “the impossible is not nothing. It is even that which happens, which comes, by definition”). The only possible hospitality is conditional, “the conditions, the norms, the rights and the duties that are imposed on hosts and hostesses, on the men or women who give a welcome as well as the men or women who receive it.”

On the one hand, unconditional and conditional hospitality contradict each other. Conditional hospitality challenges, corrupts, and perverts unconditional hospitality by failing or refusing to meet its unconditional standard; likewise, unconditional hospitality perpetually commands the transgression of all conditions in order to reach that standard. But on the other hand, unconditional and conditional hospitality need each other. Hospitality’s conditions “would cease to be laws of hospitality if they were not guided, given inspiration, given aspiration, required even, by the law of unconditional hospitality.” Likewise, since unconditional hospitality is on its own impossible, its only chance for existence is being that inspiration and aspiration—“[i]t wouldn’t be effectively unconditional . . . if it didn’t have to become effective, concrete, determined, if that were not its being as having-to-be.” It is precisely that process of becoming which this paper intends to elucidate, following Derrida’s clue of the schema.

Another refresher, this time on Kant’s doctrine of the schema itself. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant has a problem of his own, again a tension between two poles. In order for an object to be subsumed under a concept, its representation must in some way be “homogeneous” with that concept, as the representation of a circular plate is with the concept of a circle. The pure concepts of the understanding (categories), however, by definition cannot be homogeneous with any sensible intuitions (representations or appearances), seemingly barring the possibility of any objects being subsumed under such concepts. The solution, according to Kant, is to introduce the “transcendental schema,” a “third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other.” Kant argues that the transcendental schema can be nothing other than “the transcendental time-determination,” being as it is homogeneous with the category by virtue of their shared a priori universality, and with the appearance by virtue of the necessary temporality of all appearances.

Why should such a schema be only “approximate and analogical,” strictly “excluded” from operation in the aporia of hospitality? Whether between unconditional and conditional hospitality or categories and appearances, the schema is positioned to overcome a problematic heterogeneity.
But the former pair differs from the latter in two related ways. Firstly, whereas categories and appearances are simply heterogeneous, unconditional and conditional hospitality are heterogeneous and homogeneous—hence the aporia. Secondly, and most importantly, hospitality’s internal heterogeneity is not simply a matter of difference, as it is with categories and appearances, but of contradiction. While categories and appearances are merely too dissimilar for subsumption to take place without help from a third party, unconditional and conditional hospitality exclude each other, by extension excluding Kant’s schema from providing identical assistance.

To find the requisite approximation and analogy, a Derridean reading of the schema must be reconstructed. While Derrida never wrote about this aspect of Kant’s philosophy at length, it seems possible to follow a route through Heidegger, one of Derrida’s most prominent influences, whose destruction of metaphysics was enacted even “more radically,” according to Derrida, than that of Nietzsche or Freud. Heidegger allocated a major—if not fully realised—role for the schema in his own thinking. Indeed, “Kant’s doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of temporality” was set to occupy the first division of Part Two of *Being and Time*—it was never completed. But Heidegger did manage to provide a general idea of his intentions, positing that though Kant was “[t]he first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves,” he nevertheless stayed “closed off to . . . its real dimensions and its central ontological function” by remaining “oriented towards the traditional way in which time had been ordinarily understood.” This ordinary understanding of time is one in which the temporal modality of the present is privileged, and in terms of which the other modalities are interpreted: the past as the collection of those presents that once were, the future as the collection of those presents that are yet to be. As its title suggests, *Being and Time* argues that metaphysics has, on the basis of the ordinary understanding of time, problematically determined the present as presence, a determination that Heidegger seeks to overturn and replace by reconceptualising time itself.

Yet Derrida was deeply suspicious of Heidegger’s attempts to transcend this ordinary (“metaphysical” or “vulgar”) understanding of time, as he was of the entire Heideggerean endeavour to simply replace metaphysics with a new way of thinking. For Derrida, one could not destroy and supersede but only deconstruct the “metaphysics of presence,” “operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure . . . deconstruction always in certain way falls prey to its own work.” Thus according to Derrida
“there is no “vulgar concept of time.” The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence. Therefore we can only conclude that the entire system of metaphysical concepts, throughout its history, develops the so-called “vulgarity” of the concept of time . . . but also that an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality. In attempting to produce this other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological predicates. All one can do is use the metaphysical concept of time (the only concept of time) to deconstruct itself. If the intermediate schema of hospitality must in some sense be temporal, in accordance with the Kantian analogy, this investigative pathway has brought us to what seems like a dead end.

Yet Heidegger’s work did not stop with Being and Time: he managed to develop his reading of the schema further in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, published just two years later, where it is described as the “central core” of the Critique of Pure Reason. But rather than rehearse Heidegger’s argument directly, and in so doing see if we can find a Derridean route out of our predicament, Derrida’s suggestion that the “entire chain that makes possible the communication of the movement of temporalization and the schematism of imagination, pure sensibility and the autoaffection of the present by itself, all that Heidegger’s reading has strongly repeated in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics could, by way of a carefully staked out path, lead us back on to Rousseauist ground would allow us to consult Rousseau instead, whose concern with the imagination (recalling that for Kant, the imagination, positioned between perception and understanding, is the faculty through which the schema operates—“the procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept”) Derrida considers in more significant depth.

Indeed, the imagination is allocated an enormous array of functions in Derrida’s reading of Rousseau. For instance, while Rousseau takes pity to be an inborn inclination, imagination is “that without which pity would neither awaken nor exercise itself within the human order”—that which allows us to imagine the suffering of others and thereby actualise our pity by directing it to them. Likewise, while all living beings eventually face their demise, it is the imagination alone that allows us to anticipate that demise by imagining it, transforming it into death proper; imagination is therefore “at bottom the relationship with death”—recalling as well that “[t]he relation with the other and the relation with death are one and the same opening.” Imagination is that which opens desire, as only by imagining that which we want can we desire it—but this imagining perpetually exceeds
what we can accomplish, simultaneously the condition of possibility and impossibility of the fulfilment of desire, the “origin of the difference between power and desire.”\textsuperscript{33} Along the way, it is also that which “opens the possibility of progress,”\textsuperscript{34} “broaches history,”\textsuperscript{35} and that out of which “[l]anguage is born.”\textsuperscript{36}

Imagination is unique in that it “alone has the power of giving birth to itself”—it is “pure auto-affection.”\textsuperscript{37} Consequently, in an identity that incorporates it decisively into Derrida’s thought, imagination “is the other name for différance as auto-affection.”\textsuperscript{38} “Différance” is a word of Derrida’s invention—though technically speaking, it “is neither a word nor a concept,”\textsuperscript{39} but rather (like Rousseau’s imagination) it is that which opens conceptuality itself. Différance is that which “defers-differs”\textsuperscript{40}: all elements in a language, for instance, attain significance only in their relationships of difference to other elements, relationships that never arrive at an absolute or transcendental grounding, a final determined centre, but rather that are ceaselessly deferred from one element to the next. This is what makes deconstruction possible—since différance always troubles any attempts at attaining presence from within, such attempts can always be turned on themselves and disrupted, just as Derrida shows with respect to metaphysical time (the only time). But if this is so, we face the same dead end we did before: différance apparently cannot supply us with a new temporal schema, since it is precisely that which ensures that any conception of time we may formulate remains within metaphysics. It seems we can turn nowhere for more detail but back to our first—and now last—hope: Kant.

We have already discussed above why Kant’s schema is excluded from hospitality in its exact and non-analogical form. But it must also be noted that for Derrida such a schema is incoherent even within its own proper domain. For Derrida, the subsumption of a particularity under a generality can never be assured, but must always pass through the trial of undecidability. As he writes with respect to the aporia of justice, “[e]ach case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely.”\textsuperscript{41} I insert this emphasis to highlight not just the ethical questionability but the very impossibility of such a rule. Since Kant’s schema is nothing other than “a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept,”\textsuperscript{42} it cannot absolutely guarantee its own interpretation (a corollary of Nietzsche’s original insight that the generalities of language carve up the world in contingent and inexact ways, accentuating certain qualities and processes while occluding others, always beholden to the uncertainty of metaphor and metonymy,\textsuperscript{43} to which Derrida is heir\textsuperscript{44}). If unconditional hospitality is the general to conditional hospital-
ity’s particulars, there could likewise be no rule—no schema—that would absolutely guarantee the correspondence between the two, the successful intervention within the latter in the name of the former.45 This is commensurate with Derrida’s statement that, with respect to unconditional and conditional hospitality, “we can move from one to the other only by means of an absolute leap, a leap beyond knowledge and power, beyond norms and rules.”46 If it is not a rule Derrida wants for his schema, what does he want?

To answer this question, it must be noted that while we have thus far only been concerned with Kant’s schema as it appears in Critique of Pure Reason, where it is defined and described as such for the first and only time, it reappears fully-formed in Critique of Judgment as well.47 There, Kant’s concern is with, among other things, judgments of taste. A “logical judgment” subsumes an appearance under a concept by way of a schema, as detailed in the first Critique, but a judgment of taste proceeds by “schematizing without a concept,” a possibility not given when the schema was first introduced.48 Without a determinate concept, since “the aesthetic power of judgment in judging the beautiful refers the imagination in its free play to the understanding so that it will harmonize with the understanding's concepts in general (which concepts they are is left indeterminate).”49 This free play is “lawfulness without a law,”50 imagination and understanding “harmoniz[ing] with each other as required for cognition in general”51 (lawfulness) without being bound by any particular concept (law). Disagreement remains among Kantian scholars as to what precisely such harmony would look like,52 a problem “notoriously difficult to penetrate.”53

Derrida does offer his own reading of Kant’s aesthetic theory, but with little in the way of interpreting aesthetic schematising.54 Yet “freeplay” is an old Derridean phrase, the “permutation or the transformation of elements,” “a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble.”55 Can we simply equate Kant’s free play with Derrida’s freeplay? It would give us the interesting result that aesthetic schematising is without a concept, but not without concepts—in other words, it is the successive substitution of one concept after another, rather than an obscure “pure” experience of generality as such. Harmony between the imagination and the understanding would then be a matter of finding the right rhythm of such free play, the right temporal sequence from which an effect greater than the sum of its parts could emerge. Could we make an analogous argument for conditional hospitality? The successive substitution of one condition or set of conditions for another—the freeplay of conditionality—would generate an unconditional rhythm. Not unconditional in any single moment (the impossible itself), but unconditionality as an emergent “effect” of rhythmic variation in conditionality.
The unconditional hospitality that emerges from rhythmic conditioning is thus not the attainment of perfection through a completed and total purification process, a deconditioning of conditions until they become unconditional. Rather, it is an arrangement of conditions whose unconditional effect is irreducible to its constituent parts, though nevertheless dependent on them for its existence. Let us consider another emergent phenomenon—superconductors—as an analogy. Normal conducting material always has some non-zero electrical resistance, by virtue of its impurities. Resistance can be reduced by cooling the material, but even approaching absolute zero, some resistance remains. Yet a superconducting material, once cooled below a certain characteristic critical temperature, suddenly manifests exactly zero electrical resistance. This surprising phenomenon is a consequence of quantum mechanics, specifically the Meissner-Ochsenfeld effect. Thus, it is not the realisation of perfect conductivity as operationalised heuristically in classical physics. Rather, the complex arrangement of the molecules of a superconducting material in crystalline lattices allow electrons to form pairs which together move without resistance. In other words, superconductivity emerges from a spatial “rhythm” (rather than temporal, as with hospitality) whose efficacy is irreducible to its constituent parts, though nevertheless dependent upon them for its existence.

Rhythm as schema is something hinted at by Derrida, albeit in a quite different context, namely a discussion of the fall of Eastern European totalitarian regimes. Trying to account for the coexistence of the certainty that was felt prior to those falls that they would transpire with the uncertainty about when exactly that would be, he suggests that “between the most general kinds of logic (with the greatest predictability) and the most unpredictable singularities, comes the intermediate schema of rhythm.” For Kant’s aesthetic theory, the general logic would be that of the concepts, while the singularities would be the works of art. For Derrida, either unconditional hospitality, as a unique and unitary injunction, is a “general kind of logic,” with the individual conditions serving as singularities, or each of the conditions is a general logic, with the singularities as every absolutely unexpected, incalculable arrival of the guest, infinitely other from every Other and therefore singular—or both.

In any event, Derrida tells us elsewhere that rhythm “has always haunted our tradition, without ever reaching the center of its concerns.” This is because rhythm is a fundamentally decentering thing, inasmuch as a centre, as far as the “tradition” is concerned, is “a point of presence, a fixed origin.” “In the beginning, rhythm, says von Bülow” says Derrida, “[a]nother way of marking the fact that there is no simple beginning; no rhythm without repetition, spacing, caesura—no simple beginning, no
fixed origin, no point of presence, no centre. This understanding of rhythm stands in stark relief with Heidegger’s own, articulated as an aside in one of his poetic analyses. For him, “rhythm, \textit{rhusmos}, does not mean flux and flowing, but rather structure. Rhythm is what is at rest, what structures the movement of dance and song, and thus lets it rest within itself\textsuperscript{65}—rhythm as structure, as that which is at rest, that which is \textit{present}.

But what if Derrida’s centreless rhythm is exactly what Heidegger had been looking for all along, an alternative to the metaphysical concept of time? Of course it would no longer be a concept of time itself, but of something “before” time, rhythm as that which gives rise to time—not an alternative to the metaphysical concept \textit{of} time, but an alternative \textit{to} time, a “rhythm, moreover, [that] is not an alternation that additionally would be temporal. It is rather the movement of temporalization itself.”\textsuperscript{66} While the state of affairs in which “the now is determined as the intemporal kernel of time, the nonmodifiable nucleus of temporal modification”\textsuperscript{67} deconstructs any concept of time, we can nevertheless coherently “recognize in an \textit{arrhythmic} caesura the respiration of rhythm,”\textsuperscript{68} that which lets it breath and gives it life, because rhythm, unlike time, thrives on its own discontinuity, its auto-deconstruction. Likewise, rhythm can be taken as the key to Rousseau’s imagination and its multiple functions. The self in the process of affecting itself is undergoing a temporal procedure, one that can take on any number of different sequences and timings. To harmonise with itself, like the harmony between the faculties of imagination and understanding, is to find a good rhythm in which to go about this auto-affection. With respect to language, to quote Derrida quoting Nietzsche, “to mistake the rhythm of a sentence is to mistake the very meaning of the sentence.”\textsuperscript{69} The deferral of \textit{différance} is just the same, a matter of timing, of rhythm—when to stop, when to go, when to double back. Space does not permit the full development of these and other various imaginative strands that would be and still are necessary. Suffice it to say that the “yet unnameable glimmer that lies beyond the closure”\textsuperscript{70} is the rhythmically flashing, shining light of life, language, and difference, of past, present and future, of beauty, harmony, and hospitality.

Now the simplest case of hospitality involves a host giving to the guest, both staying put in their respective roles. The rhythmic variation of conditions in this case would only be those conditions imposed by the host on the guest—not only for the initial receipt into the hospitable domain, but for any given act of giving that may occur once there. While this may very well meet the necessary requirements for unconditionality, it is important to consider more complex cases, where the roles of host and guest are subject to change. This could either be a case of direct “reciprocation,” where,
after one round of hospitality, the host and guest switch roles, giving proceeding along the opposite direction in which it started, or even in a more dispersed community of hospitality, where any given person may be a host or guest for any other, unpredictably and without the necessity of direct inversion (this last case that seems most attuned to the problem of the “third” apropos Levinas, which after all is the problem of politics itself, beyond the “purity” of the face-to-face of Self and Other and toward the other Other). The trouble is that any disruption of the unidirectionality of the host-guest relationship, any indication that the guest may return something to the host, either while being welcomed or afterward, is a challenge to unconditional hospitality. Since “forgiveness granted to the other is the supreme gift and therefore hospitality par excellence,” hospitality is itself a gift, and so no return can be countenanced: “[f]or there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt.”

Even recognising the gift as gift would be enough to annul it, “to annul the gift even before recognition becomes gratitude.” In other words, since recognition annuls the gift, a fortiori gratitude annuls it.

Then what to make of the “Preamble” to Aporias, in which Derrida contends that he “ha[s] often denigrated thankfulness and the business of thanking,” that he has “doubted it too often—up to the point of publishing these doubts, quite recently,” “felt the ingratitude of expressing one’s gratitude too often for [him] to dare say [his] thankfulness, or formulate a few sentences that could measure [his] gratitude here?” This denigration, doubt, and insufficient daring would not be a simple oversight, an accidental forgetting that can be easily fixed by tacking on a footnote about gratitude somewhere. Rather, the affirmation of gratitude fundamentally questions the entire ethical edifice he has constructed. To admit that gratitude deserves a place is to reconsider the entire theory of the gift—and therefore of hospitality, forgiveness, and so on—that Derrida has already bequeathed to us. To be sure, gratitude is necessary insofar as it is a mark of conditionality; since the pure, thankless gift is impossible, some gratitude must always find its way in to the mix. But to suppose that Derrida had denigrated gratitude “too often” is to suggest that it is not merely necessary but in some way even desirable, ethical, that a treatment of its necessity is not enough to do it justice—to do justice itself, since “[d]econstruction is justice” and “hospitality [...] is a name or an example of deconstruction.”

To begin to understand this, we may formulate an aporia of gratitude, which is in fact doubly aporetic, since its very concept as a return contradicts itself one time more than the usual aporia (or does the contradiction of a contradiction annul contradiction itself?). On the one hand, there is conditional gratitude, gratitude given for a specific, calculable, measurable deed
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of the Other. This is what Kant calls gratitude: “honoring a person because of a benefit he has rendered us”\(^7\) (one of the three duties of love, the others being beneficence and sympathy\(^9\)). Unconditional gratitude would then be gratitude given for no reason at all, infinitely, incalculably, and immeasurably, to whomever, wherever, whenever. But such hyperbolic gratitude necessarily turns on itself, annuls itself: just as no gift can be a gift without being given, and therefore recognised, and therefore annulled, gratitude cannot be gratitude without being grateful for something. If we are grateful for everything, that which we lose and that which we gain, then we are grateful for nothing—unless we learn to be grateful in rhythm.

As before, it is the rhythm of gratitude that will allow unconditionality to emerge. Recall Mauss’ elaboration of the gift\(^8\), which Derrida explicitly draws upon\(^1\), where the gift always bears within it the obligation to reciprocate. A gift is given by a giver to a receiver, and at some future point the receiver is obligated to give a gift in return. (Of course it is precisely this obligation that Derrida challenges, opting instead for the absence of all reciprocation as the marker of the true gift. Yet the “obligation” of reciprocation is not so much a duty for Derrida as it is an expression of the impossibility of the pure, unreciprocated gift.) Notice how for Mauss the gift cannot be reciprocated immediately, as this would make it mere barter, an economic transaction. Rather, a period of time must elapse in between. In total, after reciprocation has transpired, no net value will actually have changed hands between the two parties. Rather, what does change hands is the time spent in possession of the gift. That is to say, once one receives the gift, one has time before one must reciprocate—one is given this time itself. Thus for Derrida the gift is always the gift of time: “the gift only gives to the extent it gives time. The difference between a gift and every other operation of pure and simple exchange is that the gift gives time. There where there is gift, there is time. What it gives, the gift, is time.”\(^8\) Then unconditionality must emerge from the proper rhythm of reciprocation, from the temporal sequencing of giving and gratitude. Time is given, while rhythm is the totality of the giving and receiving of time in sequence. If everyone gives all that they have to everyone else\(^8\), as unconditional hospitality practiced by all requires, then either no one will have anything or everyone will have everything. The third option, the only desirable and coherent one, is for a certain rhythm of exchange to be found—gratitude is the disposition that ensures that such exchanges are fitting and proper.

Yet the voice of Walter Benjamin resounds, asking if rhythmic hospitality, as the application of Kant’s aesthetic schematising to the political, is not the “aestheticizing of political life” characteristic of fascism.\(^8\) The answer must come in the negative. The work of art that is fascist politics is a closed
one; this does not mean that it never undergoes actual change, but that at any given moment its conception of itself is one in which its goal is set, its finish line known and in sight, even if it is never reached, and where the unexpected irrelevant. The closed stands in opposition to the open—openness to the future and all that it brings, including the unexpected arrival of the Other. This is how Derrida is able to choose sides between a certain “bin Laden” and “the ‘international antiterrorist’ coalition”—the former’s actions and discourse “open onto no future and . . . have no future,” while the latter “leaves a perspective open to perfectibility,” even if “merely an assertion and a purely verbal commitment” and in spite of “all the de facto betrayals, all the failures to live up to democracy.” Indeed, “the democratic promise . . . will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated.” There is not and cannot be a final utopia, an end to history: it is the process of change itself, the rhythm of that change, that allows true hospitality, true gratitude, true justice to emerge. This rhythm need not be absolutely predictable ahead of time, and in fact must not be if it is to allow for the arrival of the unexpected guest. It need not be a regular oscillation, but may continuously transform, deform, and re-form itself in irregular and unpredictable ways. Each new moment in a rhythmic sequence redefines the rhythm of the past, since rhythm always concerns a duration that is extended as time moves on. Thus, at any given moment, no rhythm is “complete,” but rather remains exposed to unanticipated alteration.

Rhythm necessarily remains open to the future because it has no present. Rhythm has no beginning, just as it has no end. Rhythm, like the impossible, is always to come.

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NOTES


2 For his most sustained treatment of aporia as such, see Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying – awaiting (one another at) the “limits of truth,” trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). Derrida describes aporia as an “impossible passage, the refused, denied, or prohibited passage, indeed the nonpassage, which can in fact be something else, the event of a coming or of a future advent . . . which no longer has the form of the movement that consists in passing, traversing, or transiting. It would be the “coming to pass” of an event that would no longer have the form or the appearance of a pas [step]: in sum, a coming without pas” (Derrida, Aporias: Dying – awaiting (one another at) the “limits of truth,” 8). The notion of the aporia has its origins in ancient Greek philosophy. Plato’s early dialogues typically end with an aporia; for an example of such a dialogue, see Plato, “Euthypro” in Defence of Socrates, Euthypro, Crito, ed. and trans. David Gallop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). In contrast, a repeated method of Aristotle’s is to begin his inquiry with an apparent aporia and proceed to work his way out of it; for Derrida’s discussion of Aristotle’s aporia of time, see Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē: Note on a Note from Being and Time” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

3 Ibid., 147, original emphasis.

4 Ibid., 149.


6 Ibid., 77.

7 Ibid., 75.


Ibid., 75-77.

Ibid., 79.

Ibid., 79, original emphasis.

Kant’s doctrine of the schema has attracted particular ire and consternation from fellow philosophers since its publication. Schopenhauer, though always a staunch critic of the Kantian project, isolated the schema for special denunciation, calling it “an audacious piece of nonsense,” “an absurdity whose non-existence is plain” (Arthur Schopenhauer, Manuscript Remains, Volume 2: Critical Debates (1809-1818), trans. P. F. Payne (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1988), 466-472). Jacobi viewed the schema as “the most wonderful and most mysterious of all unfathomable mysteries and wonders” (cited in Eva Schaper, “Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered”, Review of Metaphysics 18, no. 2 (1964): 270). Even Kant himself called it “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 273) while still dismissing an explanation of its workings as “dry and boring” (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 274). It exactly fits Derrida’s trickster attitude to choose this audacious, absurd, nonsensical, mysterious, unfathomable, wonderful, deep, hidden, dry, boring fragment of Kant’s philosophy as the cornerstone of his own (if not yet fully developed) political theory.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 272.

Ibid., 272.

Ibid., 272.


Ibid., 45.

Heidegger, Being and Time.

Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē: Note on a Note from Being and Time.”


Ibid., 63.


Ibid., 63. Whence the redundancy of this phrase “central core”? Is there or can there be any core that is not central? Is there or can there be any centre that is not at the core? It would seem so, since “[t]he center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since it does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the total-
ity has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center” should become “[t]he center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center” (Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”, 248, original emphasis). The inability to think this centreless centre would then be symptomatic of Heidegger’s failure to escape recourse to a transcendental signified, the centre that is (or pretends to be) the centre.

27 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 342-343.
28 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 273.
29 Ibid., 183.
30 For Derrida’s discussion of the Heideggerean distinction between demise and death, see Derrida, Aporias: Dying – awaiting (one another at) the “limits of truth,” 37-42.
31 Ibid., 184.
32 Ibid., 187.
33 Ibid., 186.
34 Ibid., 182.
35 Ibid., 182.
36 Ibid., 183.
37 Ibid., 186.
38 Ibid., 187.
40 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 66.
42 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 273.
45 This obstacle would be in addition to that rendered by conditional hospitality as law. Even if the correct conditions could be found, no rule could absolutely guarantee the determination of a particular case as subsumable under a given condition—as warranting the application of conditional hospitality.

Ibid., 151.

Ibid., 112-113.

Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 62, original emphasis.


Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” 248-264. Note that “freeplay” is given as a translation for the original French “jeu” (e.g. Jacques Derrida, “La structure, le signe, et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines” in *L’écriture et la différence* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 427), which could just as easily, and perhaps more accurately, be translated simply as “play”. The translation as “freeplay” might give the impression that the play in question is wholly unbounded, unpredictable, or unintelligible, proceeding in any and all directions, an infinite interpretive license. Yet Derridean freeplay is not the destruction of presence but “the disruption of presence” (ibid., 263). As Derrida explains, he “never proposed ‘a kind of ‘all or nothing’ choice between pure realization of self-presence and complete freeplay or undecidability.’ [He] never believed in this and [he] never spoke of ‘complete freeplay or undecidability . . . .’ Greatly overestimated in [his] texts in the United States, this notion of ‘freeplay’ is an inadequate translation of the lexical network connected to the word jeu, which [he] used in [his] first texts, but sparingly and in a highly defined manner” (Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 115-116). Derrida has “never accepted saying, or encouraging others to say, just anything at all, nor ha[s he] argued for indeterminacy as such” (ibid., 145).

The need for a Derridean theory of emergence should by now be clear, though it exceeds the limits of the present article. Suffice it to say that such a theory would need to incorporate the problematic of the general and the particular already mentioned, while also deconstructing the received strong/weak emergence binary. Cf. Mark A. Bedau, “Weak Emergence” in *Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 11: Mind, Causation, and the World*, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997).


Ibid., 10.

Jacques Derrida, “The Deconstruction of Actuality” in *Negotiations: Interventions*
Derrida and the Rhythm of Hospitality


64 Derrida, “Désistance” 223, original emphasis.


68 Derrida, “Désistance”, 225, original emphasis.

69 Quoted in Derrida, “Désistance”, 223. For Lacoue-Labarthe’s quoting of the same passage, see Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, 161. For the original source, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, eds. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 138. Note that all three of these translations are different from one another.

70 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 14.


74 Ibid., 14, original emphasis.

75 Derrida, Aporias: Dying – awaiting (one another at) the “limits of truth”, ix.


77 Derrida, “Hostipitality”, 364.


79 Ibid., 246.
Ironically, Jesus and Nietzsche made the same “mistake” of issuing directives whose coherence depended on their adoption by a select few only. For the former, this was the equivalent of unconditional hospitality in its non-emergent form, to “go and sell all your possessions and the give the money to the poor” (Matthew 19:21 NLT). After a certain critical number of people (greater than those who have followed that directive since) would do so, the poor would no longer be poor; if the formerly-poor tried to follow the directive at that point, they would have no one to give to. In Nietzsche’s case, the Übermensch can create values and exert his power unencumbered only if there are few or no other Übermenschen around. But a community of Übermenschen, each Übermensch with their own incommensurable set of values, would require—again, the height of irony—a democracy. For Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Graham Parkes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). For Derrida’s claim that Nietzsche’s critique of democracy does not extend to Derrida’s own concept of the “democracy to come”, see Jacques Derrida, “Nietzsche and the Machine” in Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, ed. and trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 234-235. For the necessary co-implication of democracy and hospitality, see Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, 63. For a third-party consideration of Derrida, Nietzsche, and democracy, see Avital Ronell, “Untread and Untried: Nietzsche Reads Derridocracy”, Diacritics 38, no. 1-2 (2008): 158-171.


Derrida, “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides”, 113-114, original emphasis.


The rhythm of dialectics, that temporal sequence of transformations, whether as given by Hegel (see G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)) or Marx (see Karl Marx, “Afterward to the Second German Edition”, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Classics, 1992)), is closed in two senses. Firstly, by the predetermination of the end: Absolute Spirit and communism, respectively. Secondly, by the banal repetition of the rhythm that gets us there: negation and negation of negation. Recalling that the aporia of hospitality is “nondialectizable” (Derrida, “Step of Hospitality / No Hospitality,” 77), we can see how hospitality and its host-guest relationship challenge the master-slave dialectic, for instance, at its source. Consider Pitt-Rivers’ reinterpretation (Julian Pitt-Rivers,
“The law of hospitality”, *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 2, no.1: 501-517) of Boas’ ethnographic account (Franz Boas, *The Central Eskimo* [sic] (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1877) of the arrival of a stranger in an Inuit community. When such a stranger arrives, a champion from the community is chosen, and the two proceed with a fight to the death. This is analogous to Hegel’s scenario of the struggle for recognition (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 111-118). Whereas in Hegel’s account the loser is he who is first to beg for mercy, in Boas’ it is the victor who, at the last minute, spares his vanquished foe. In Hegel’s case, the vanquished becomes the slave to the victor, with all the dialectical consequences that follow. But for Boas, according to the interpretation of Pitt-Rivers, things proceed differently: if it is the stranger who is victorious, they become the honoured guest of the community, having proved themselves as someone worth honouring through their martial prowess and mercy, while if the champion claims victory, the stranger (whose life the champion has just spared) becomes the champion’s responsibility, the stranger now the champion’s guest. Thus no matter who wins, the life-and-death struggle does not result in a master and a slave but in a host and a guest. While the Inuit example is but one of the many possible, it is a simple illustration that “[t]he other is not the negation of the same, as Hegel would like to say. The fundamental fact of the ontological scission into same and other is a non-allergic relation of the same with the other” (Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 305)—in other words, hospitality.